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HERCULES, OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE,
AND THE RIGHT ANSWER THESIS
MICHAEL B. W. SINCLAIR*
About twenty years ago when I was teaching jurisprudence I
needed a filler because for some reason about half the students were
going to be absent.  We’d spent time on St. Thomas Aquinas’ Treatise
on Law,1 and we’d spent a little time on Ronald Dworkin’s arguments
against positivism in Taking Rights Seriously.2  It struck me that Dwor-
kin’s omniscient judge Hercules3 was similar to an omniscient deity,
and that the question of judicial discretion in the face of Hercules was
pretty much like the question of free will and an omniscient deity that
so bothered Aquinas.  So the prima facie clash and the resolutions of it
should also be pretty much alike.  In particular, Anthony Kenny’s anal-
ysis of one of Aquinas’s arguments struck me as directly applicable to
Hercules and judicial discretion.4  If so, a central part of Dworkin’s
“right answer thesis” might collapse.  It was this odd and somewhat un-
likely juxtaposition that I put together as a lecture, not to go on the
final examination, but for a bit of jurisprudential entertainment.  Every
now and then since I’ve thought I should resurrect those notes and
turn them into a short article.   This symposium offered just the forum
for it.
THE PROBLEM
Dworkin’s Hercules is a model of a unitary judge, with unlimited
access to information about the world, law, and everything else, unlim-
ited capacity to process that data, and unlimited time so that he pro-
duces the right answer.5  If there is a right answer, then the judge
deciding does not have discretion:  she either gets the right answer or
* Professor, New York Law School.  I abandon my copyright in this essay:  copy it
if you please, in whole or in part, with or without attribution.
1. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Questions 90-97 (Resnery Publish-
ing, Inc. 1996) (1273).
2. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110 (1977).
3. Id. at 105-30.
4. ANTHONY KENNY, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, AQUINAS, 255
(Anthony Kennedy ed., 1969).
5. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 105 et seq.
447
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she makes a mistake.  Hercules and the right answer thesis have a se-
ductive appeal; it is the sort of appeal that makes people say judges find
law, not make law.  If the judge does not find the right one then she
either makes a mistake or makes it up; there has to be a law for her to
find, and that means no more than that there exists a single correct
decision.
I should like to try to work this out as a de dicto-de re modality con-
fusion, in a manner similar to Kenny’s analysis of one of Aquinas’s ar-
guments for free will given an omniscient God.6  If it succeeds then
Dworkin’s right answer thesis will fail on its own terms, but not because
its terms fail (a widely accepted contention).
Aquinas’s problem is variously stated as follows: God’s foreknowl-
edge is incompatible with human freedom; or, how can God know
what I shall do and I be free to choose what I shall do? Or, if in Eternal
Law, God sets up all the causal determinants of my future action, how
can I freely choose otherwise?
The problem really bothered Aquinas, so much that he gave thir-
teen solutions to it.  Here is the one that I want to follow:  “Whatever is
known by God must be; for whatever is known by us must be, and
God’s knowledge is more certain than ours.  But nothing which is fu-
ture and contingent must be.  Therefore, nothing which is future and
contingent is known by God.”7
To the extent that there is an analogy between Hercules’ elimina-
tion of judicial discretion and God’s elimination of free will, we need
to find a way out or abandon one or other, God/Hercules or free will/
discretion.  Now I think Hercules is a fairly useless model of judicial
process for many reasons; but I think the argument that he eliminates
discretion in judicial decision making should not hold, that discretion
should be salvageable just as free will can be salvaged from an omnis-
cient God even if the model were useful.  To the extent it is convinc-
ing, Aquinas’s argument for their compatibility ought also to work.
For a start I shall not spell out all of Aquinas’s version and Kenny’s
downloading of it into modal logic terms.  At least until the difficult
6. KENNY, supra note 4, at 258-60.  I should like to emphasize that the arguments
that follow did not originate with me: they are my rehashing of Kenny’s fascinating
analysis of Aquinas’s arguments.
7. ST.THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I, Question 14, art.3.  Does he
mean that God cannot do the causal calculus implicit in the Eternal law?  Kenny says
no:  Aquinas uses “contingent” = “not causally determined”; but Aquinas included in
contingent actions, for example, the budding of a tree. KENNY, supra note 4, at 258.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR412.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-MAR-03 16:10
2002-2003] HERCULES, OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE 449
part, I shall just have a go at it as argument about law and judicial
decisions.
FIRST ARGUMENT
(0)  “whatever Hercules decides must be right” has 2 analyses: de dicto
and de re.
(1) De re:  If H’s decision is X, then X must be right.
(2) De dicto:  It is true to say: “What H decides is right” or “If H decides
X then X is right.”
(1) is false;  (2) is true.
I shall use standard logical signs:  Where P and Q are propositions,
“P ⊃ Q” is an abbreviation for “If P then Q”;  “@ P” is an abbreviation
for “Necessarily P.”
 In the following examples (5), the de dicto version, is true:  it tells no
more than the meaning of “If . . . then . . .”;  but (6), the de re version,
is false; it is by no means necessary that there be a law school in Man-
hattan, after all, for many years there was not.
(3)  There is a law school in Manhattan ⊃ there is a law school in Man-
hattan.   [T]
(4)  NYLS is a law school in Manhattan ⊃ there is a law school in Man-
hattan.   [T]
(5) @ (NYLS is a law school in Manhattan ⊃ there is a law school in
Manhattan.)  [T]
(6)  NYLS is a law school in Manhattan ⊃ @ (there is a law school in
Manhattan.)  [F]
Same procedure:
(7)  There is a right answer ⊃ there is a right answer.  [T]
(8)  Hercules’ is the right answer ⊃ there is a right answer.   [T]
(9) @(Hercules’ is the right answer ⊃ there is a right answer.)   [T]
(10)   Hercules’ is the right answer ⊃ @(there is a right answer.)  [F]
How is the content of the antecedent in (8) spelled out?  Does it differ
from the content of the antecedent in (7)?  Not in a serious way.  After
all,
(8’)  Sinclair’s is the right answer ⊃ there is a right answer.
is also true.   (7) is simply less specific about which answer is right.  So
the argument still does not hold because (10) with the antecedent of
(7) substituted is still false.
Go back to (0), (1), (2).
(0’)  Whatever Hercules decides necessarily is right.
Again, there are two analyses.  First, de dicto:
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(2’) @ (whatever H decides is right.)
But this has no tendency to show that whatever you or I decide is not at
our discretion, not free —
(2’’) @(If H decides X then X is right.)
cf. de re:
(1’’)  If H decides X then necessarily X is right.
which is clearly false.  X is possibly wrong, thus although it may be right
it is not necessarily right.  Insofar as X could be otherwise and X is a
decision of mine, I have not had my discretion, my free will removed.
Thus goes Aquinas’ argument, re-framed onto Hercules and the
right answer thesis.  In a formal way it looks O.K. and Kenny says of it:
“It seems to me, therefore, that St. Thomas’ answer to this particular
difficulty is entirely satisfactory.”8
But, like Kenny, I find it peculiarly unsatisfying.  The reason lies in
what we take to be the source of God’s knowledge, and in our argu-
ment, Hercules’ decision making.  With God’s knowledge as the sub-
ject, one now proceeds to do a standard analysis of “know” and
“knowledge,” that it must be justified, and about God’s doing Eternal
Law’s causal calculus.  The following is an attempted parallel, working
on the requirement that decisions be justified, even Hercules’
decisions.
Because we require Hercules to justify his decisions, and rightness
to rest on the justification, the de dicto version, (2’’), goes to:
(11) @ (H decides X and H is justified deciding X ⊃ X is right.)
But this applies to anyone, not only Hercules.  It is the analogue to
Aquinas’s remark:  “whatever is known by us must be”; whatever deci-
sion is justified must be the right one.
And the de re version, (1’’), goes to:
(12)  If H decides X and is justified in deciding X ⊃ @ (X is right).
What is an Herculian justification like?  Because of his complete
knowledge of empirical, social, and moral law and fact, it has all justifi-
catory connections, including those that bring about X.  So implicit in
the justification is the impossibility of being otherwise — that’s what it
is to have infinite information, reasoning ability, and time.  Any
counter-example, any interfering hypothesis you’d like to name, Her-
cules knows about already and has accounted for in his reasoning;
that’s what it is to be Hercules.
8. KENNY, supra note 4, at 260.
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And there the problem still remains.  Aquinas was aware, if not of
this sort of analysis, at least of this result.  It is merely a re-framing of
the initial problem, but ducking the easy solution of the “first argument”
above.
SECOND ARGUMENT
The first pass argument showed that “What Hercules decides must
be right” can be:
de dicto:
(2’’) @(H decides X ⊃X is right)
which is true but of no consequence; or
de re:
(1’’) H decides X ⊃ @(X is right)
which would eliminate judicial discretion, but is false.
And this argument was unsatisfactory, at least in that it ignores the
difference between Hercules and ordinary judges: it ignores Hercules’
omniscience.
If you put in Hercules, with omniscience, you seem to be stuck,
inescapably, with whatever Hercules decides being necessarily right.
The basis on which Hercules knows things, a complete knowledge of
the universe including all moral, social, and causal relations, precludes
uncertainty.
When you do this argument with God’s omniscience, the key to it
is time.  Kenny paraphrases Aquinas:  “[If] it has come to God’s knowl-
edge that such and such a thing will happen, then such and such a
thing will happen.”9  This is a convenient format because it is essen-
tially tensed; it sets up Aquinas’s ultimate answer.  God is outside space
and time; time is spread out for God like a spatial dimension over
which he can look, widely, universally, and non-temporally.  Our deci-
sions occur in time, at points in time; the difference is the basis of our
free will.  But Hercules is not posited as having an a-temporal view; he
does not know the future, he just knows everything else.  The only
lever we may have is that Aquinas was dealing with facts, or the truth of
empirical propositions and God’s knowledge of it; we are dealing with
decisions, and Hercules’ making them.  Is there enough here to
continue the argument?  That’s the problem to think one’s way
around or through.
Kenny begins his next analysis of Aquinas’s problem as follows:
9. Id.
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“Gp” is an abbreviation for “It has come to God’s knowledge that p.”
(where ‘p’ ranges over propositions.)
(13) @Gp  (It has come to God’s knowledge that p (p is a future event)
+ omniscience justifies the “@”)
(14) @(Gp ⊃ p)  (de dicto truth)
(15) @(@(r ⊃ s) ⊃ @ (@r ⊃ @s))   (theorem of logic)
(16) @(@(Gp ⊃ p) ⊃ @ (@Gp ⊃ @p)) ((15),  substituting Gp/r, p/s)
therefore
(17) @p   ((13), (14), (16), modus ponens twice).
Premises (14) and (16) are hard to deny.  So Kenny goes to work
on (13), @Gp.  We do this by looking at “necessity” and the meaning of
“know”, in particular the requirement that the propositional object of
“to know” be true. The trick here is to replicate that argument for
Hercules; it turns out to be rather simple.
“Hx” is an abbreviation for “Hercules decides that x.” (where x
ranges over decisions.  That in itself is a pretty odd thing to say; but it
precludes truth as a property of those decisions; it is rightness – recti-
tude – that we’re on about here.)
(18) @(@ (Hx ⊃ x) ⊃ @(@Hx ⊃ @x))  ((15), Hx/r, x/s)
(19) @(Hx ⊃ x)   (de dicto truth)
(20) @Hx
therefore
(21) @x (modus ponens twice)
— and that is the denial of discretion.
The premises are hard to deny:  If x is “Sinclair is guilty of murder-
ing his grandfather,” then it must be the case that I murdered my
grandfather and no other decision of the case could be right; the court
presiding over my trial can decide as Hercules did or make a mistake,
render an injustice.  The court therefore does not have discretion.
Really?
(18) is inviolate.  It’s a theorem of modal logic.
(19) is inviolate.  It’s a theorem of modal logic.
So we have to attack (20), @Hx.  We do this by looking at “@”:  “Hx”
always has the background that Hercules is justified in deciding x and
x is right; built into the justification and rectitude is Hercules’ omnis-
cience; that is what justifies the “@”.  But does it?
The usual interpretations of “@”, “true in all possible worlds” or
“necessarily true” do not apply as we are dealing with rectitude, not
truth.  But simply “necessary” or “could not be otherwise” work well
enough.
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Is it necessary that Hercules decides x?  If x is the right decision
then it is, but not otherwise.  That is built into the model of Hercules.
If I did not kill my grandfather, then omniscient, omnivorous Hercules
will not decide x = “Sinclair is guilty of murdering his grandfather.”
A key step in Kenny’s argument about free will and an omniscient
deity goes like this.  Is @Gp true about God’s knowledge because it is
knowledge of a necessarily omniscient being? I.e., if God is omniscient
then Gp, “it has come to God’s knowledge that p”, is true for all substi-
tutions for p.  But that is trivially false:  substitute “2 + 2 = 3” for p.
Thus, if p is false God doesn’t know that p; if p is true then God knows
p, but p is not true until its time.
So we have, acceptably, NOT (15) @Gp, but
(15’) @(p ⊃ Gp)
which is then the correct statement of omniscience — and is not in-
compatible with free will.
When we see the Herculian parallel to this argument, the game
simply falls apart.  The compulsion we felt about Hercules and the
right answer thesis is reduced to what it really is:  the right answer is
the right answer.  “@Hx” does not hold generally for all x. Most substi-
tutions for x are not the right decision (because there are indefinitely
many ways to go awry.)  It is not necessary that Hercules choose those
decisions; quite the contrary.  But it would be necessary that if x is the
right decision, that Hercules should choose it.  And Hercules will
choose x if it is the right decision:
In other words, NOT (20) @Hx, but
(22) @(x ⊃ Hx)
which is then the correct statement of the omniscience of Hercules —
and is not incompatible with judicial discretion.
i.e. NOT
(23) @(x ⊃ @Hx), which would deny discretion,
BUT
(24) @(@x ⊃ @Hx)
Hercules necessarily decides only decisions that are necessarily right
(whatever that means).  He makes contingently right decisions contin-
gently, as do our human, temporally confined, and intellectually finite
judges.10
10. If our human judiciary is significantly different, it is in not having Hercules’
grounds for picking the difference between necessary and contingent decisions or for
avoiding error.  But that doesn’t mean they do not have judicially adequate grounds for
deciding.
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All this simply shows that positing an omniscient Hercules does
little for the game but surreptitiously appeal to our intuition that there
must be a right answer – surely there must; otherwise what is the all
that mental sweat and violence expended for?  Sure there may be a
right answer –and we know that in most cases there actually is and it’s
obvious – but even the omniscient Hercules can determine it only if
it’s right.  And that is not a helpful sort of thing to say.
The point here is that even though Hercules, ex hypothesi, pro-
duces the right solution, we are not relieved of the problem of ascer-
taining its rightness, of seeing it as the right solution.  Doing that is
hardly different from deciding all over again.  The opinion, just like an
unusually high quality brief, is not conclusive of its own rectitude.
This may be something like the requirement of replicability of
proofs in mathematics (problematic with some very long computer
program proofs) or the replicability of experiments in laboratory sci-
ence.  Hercules’ reasoning process itself is, ex hypothesi, not replicable.
One final note:  Might the “right answer thesis” be put to litiga-
tion?  Might the mighty Hercules be taken to court?  The answer, sur-
prisingly, is not only that it might, but that it has.  It happened in 1774
before England’s King’s Bench and one of the greatest judges in his-
tory, Lord Mansfield: Jones v. Randall.11  What set up such a dispute?
The action was to collect on a wager.  The wager was on the out-
come of plaintiff’s appeal of another suit to the House of Lords.  Plain-
tiff saw it as insurance:  he bet against his prevailing.12  At the time,
contracts aleatory were not prohibited “by positive law” – by which in
the jargon of that time they meant “by statute” – although some might
be void in common law, for example by fraud, or, as Lord Mansfield
put it, on grounds of morality or principle,13 or by being bets on an
outcome certain to occur.  The last point is the relevant one: it was
only permissible to bet on contingent events.
There were two reports, one by Lofft,14 the other by Cowper.15
They are not the same.
11. Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 37, 98 Eng. Rep. 954; Lofft. 384, 98 Eng. Rep. 706
(1774).  The case is known for Lord Mansfield’s remarks on the nature of precedent.
12. Mr. Mansfield for defendant Randall:  “[It] was meant by the [defendant]
merely as a sort of insurance upon his cause.” Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 38, 98 Eng.
Rep. at 955.
13. Randall, 1 Cowp. at 39, 98 Eng. Rep. at 955.
14. Jones v. Randall, Lofft. 384, 98 Eng. Rep. 706 (1774).
15. Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 37, 98 Eng. Rep. 954 (1774).
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Mr. Dunning, counsel for the defendant, Randall, worked on the
conception of common law as merely declaratory of natural law, that
judges find but do not make the law; the decision is thus predeter-
mined.  Lofft reports his argument thus:  “That to make the wager fair,
the laws must be supposed uncertain; and the Judges so ignorant as
not to know, or, knowing, so wicked as not to decide accordingly; and
though the learned gentleman abstained in words from comparing it
with a lottery, yet he must in idea to justify his motion.  . . . [T]o lay a
wager of this sort, now before the Court, was as if a man were to lay a
wager upon the truth of a mathematical proposition with which he was
well acquainted.  I hope your Lordships will show the determinations
of law are certain; and too serious to be treated like matters of the least
and most despicable regard, things of mere chance.”16  Cowper has
him saying:  “It is essential to the validity of a wager that the event be
contingent:  but the laws of this country are clear, evident, and certain:
all the Judges know the laws, and, knowing them, administer justice
with uprightness and integrity.  The event therefore was certain, and of
course the wager such, as in its nature was impossible to be lost.”17
Hercules and the right answer thesis were thus made a key point of the
decision.
The reports have counsel for plaintiff, Jones, meeting Dunning’s
argument in two ways.  Lofft has him expressly contraverting the sup-
posed certainty of law with a folksy story:  “How few lawyers will venture
to pronounce a point of law certain; and if one of the counsel, having
looked in his notebook, might say, ’Tis very clear for you; another – I
think, sir, the weight of authorities makes against you – and a third, I
wish you success, but indeed ’tis doubtful – what should a man do, a
great part of his fortune depending upon the event?”18  Cowper has
him concede the ultimate, objective certainty of the law – perhaps it’s a
wise strategy not to question the wisdom and integrity of the judiciary –
but place the necessary contingency squarely on the parties, ex ante;
objective certainty maybe, but subjective contingency.  “This is a fair
transaction between the parties, whose knowledge, or rather igno-
rance, respecting the event, left it equally uncertain in whose favour it
would finally be decided.  Therefore, as between them, it was certainly
contingent.”19
16. Randall, Lofft. at 385, 98 Eng. Rep. at 706.
17. Randall, 1 Cowp. at 38, 98 Eng. Rep. at 955.
18. Randall, Lofft. at 384, 98 Eng. Rep. at 706.
19. Randall, 1 Cowp. at 37, 98 Eng. Rep. at 954 -55.
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Lord Mansfield does not spend much time on this argument.
Roughly, he says, that the law may be certain, but that certainty re-
quires a final decision (how very realist!), and a final decision costs a
great amount of money (even in 1774!), much to the benefit of the
legal profession.  Lofft:  “But the law is certain – it were very unhappy,
gentlemen, for you, if it were certain to every man, before the decision.
But this certainty is so uncertain, that it requires a great deal of money
to come at the last opinion of what is law.”20  Cowper:  “As to the cer-
tainty of the law mentioned by Mr. Dunning, it would be very hard
upon the profession, if the law was so certain, that everybody knew it:
the misfortune is that it is so uncertain, that it costs so much money to
know what it is, even in the last resort.”21   In other words, Lord Mans-
field’s answer differs only in style from Justice Jackson’s famous epi-
gram, “We are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible
because we are final.”22
Plaintiff prevailed:  The contract was enforced.
20. Randall, Lofft. at 386, 98 Eng. Rep. at 707.
21. Randall, 1 Cowp. at 40, 98 Eng. Rep. at 956.
22. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
